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Abstract 
The current article examines how societal stereotypes might form and evolve through a 
process of cumulative cultural evolution as social information is repeatedly passed from person to 
person. Social psychology research has done much to inform our understanding about the 
substantial influence stereotypes exert on us as individuals and on our society, yet comparatively 
little is known about how society’s pools of stereotype knowledge form and how they evolve. Here 
we review evidence that as social information is repeatedly passed from person to person there is a 
continuous cycle of stereotype formation and evolution that is driven by constraints and biases in: 1. 
observations of the social environment; 2. cognitive representations of the social environment; 3. 
social transmissions of cognitive representations of the social environment. We suggest the reason 
stereotypes exist and persist is because they are perfectly adapted for human cognition and that the 
reason they are perfectly adapted for human cognition is because they are the cumulative product 
of human cognition. 
  
Introduction 
Stereotypes are characterisations of social categories whereby group membership is 
associated with the possession of certain attributes (e.g., scientists are geeky, Scottish people are 
miserly, men like the color blue; Allport, 1954). Social psychology research has done much to inform 
our understanding about the substantial influence stereotypes exert on us as individuals and on our 
society (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). When people endorse stereotypes, it leads to prejudice and 
discrimination towards members of minority groups (Devine, 1989); even when people refute 
stereotypes, the mere knowledge of their content can lead to bias in thoughts and behaviour (e.g., 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Yet, in a complex social environment, stereotypes play a vital cognitive 
role in efficiently structuring social information (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Given their ubiquity 
and influence it is perhaps surprising that relatively little is known about how society’s pools of 
stereotype knowledge form and how they evolve.  
Theories of stereotype formation from a diverse range of perspectives have tended to focus 
on the social and cognitive determinants of stereotypes within individuals. These include, but are far 
from limited to, theories documenting the importance of intergroup bias (e.g., Bigler & Liben, 2007), 
cognitive bias (e.g., Hamilton & Gifford, 1976), communication bias (see Kashima, Fiedler, & Freytag, 
2008), group essentialism (e.g., Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001), group entitativity (e.g., 
Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002), category formation (e.g., McGarty, 2002), perceived status 
and competition (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2001). These theories, and many other besides, 
further our understanding of why stereotypes form within individuals but they tend not directly 
address how stereotypes across individuals. How does human culture go from situations where 
there is no stereotype associated with a group to situations where stereotype content of that group 
is near universally known? Once stereotypes are near universally known how does their content 
change over time?  
The current article presents evidence supporting the possibility that societal stereotypes 
might form and evolve through a process of cumulative cultural evolution as social information is 
repeatedly passed from person to person. We begin by providing an overview of some of the key 
theoretical tenets of research into cultural evolution. We then describe recent experimental 
evidence of the formation of novel lab-based stereotypes via cumulative cultural evolution. Finally, 
we discuss how existing evidence of constraints and biases in observation of the social environment, 
in cognitive representations of the social environment and in social transmissions of cognitive 
representation of the social environment could all contribute to the formation and evolution of 
stereotypes. 
Cultural evolution 
There is a long, if somewhat sparse, tradition of experimental psychological research 
examining how the cultural evolution of knowledge is shaped by the interaction between 
people’s observations of the environment, their cognitive representations of these 
observations and the social transmission1 of these cognitive representations. Frederic Bartlett 
(1932) examined what happened to information as it was repeatedly passed from person to person 
down a chain of individuals in a lab (a method akin to the children’s game often called ‘telephone’ or 
‘Chinese whispers’). Using a variety of different experimental scenarios (e.g., story-telling, drawings), 
Bartlett found reliable evidence that the content of information was prone to substantial 
transformation as it passed from person to person. People in Bartlett’s chains tended to forget 
information incongruent to the observed context or to their expectations. Similarly, people were 
                                                          
1 In this article, we frequently use the terms “transmission” and “social transmission” rather than 
“communication” to describe the interpersonal process of passing information from person to person. This is 
because many of the serial reproduction experiments we describe involve taking the memory output of one 
generation and using it as the training input for the next generation without any communicative intent (e.g., 
Bartlett, 1932; Kirby et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2014); in such experiments, there is no communicative intent or 
awareness on the part of the transmitter or receiver of the information sharing process. In reality, the real-
world process of social transmission is most likely to involve a process of communication whereby the person 
transmitting the information or the person receiving it, or both, has either intent and/or awareness of the 
information sharing process.  
likely to erroneously add information congruent to the observed context or to their expectations. 
The loss of incongruent information and the addition of congruent information meant that as it 
passed down the chains, information changed in predictable ways – it became simpler, logically 
structured, more memorable and consequently easier to accurately transmit across generations. 
 Researchers from a diverse range of academic backgrounds have provided insight into how 
the evolution of human culture is influenced through the social transmission and cultural diffusion of 
information (see Kashima, 2008). In the first half of the 20th Century some anthropologists (e.g., 
Perry, Rivers, Smith) and ethnologists (e.g., Frobenius, Graebner, Schmidt) proposed that the 
content of all human culture could be traced back to a single common source (e.g., ancient Egypt), 
with knowledge of cultural practices being passed directly from person to person and from society to 
society. Since the 1970s several anthropologists, biologists, geneticists and cognitive scientists have 
advanced theories of cultural evolution, which suggest human culture evolves in a manner 
analogous to biological evolution (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Campbell, 1975; Cavalli-Sforza & 
Feldman, 1981; Dawkins, 1976; Sperber, 1996). Kashima (2008) suggests these “neo-diffusionist” 
theories of culture, while divergent in many respects, are based on similar underlying propositions; 
that is, 1. Cultural information exists; 2. Cultural information exists in a form that can be 
communicated between people; 3. People learn cultural information from other people’s 
communications; 4. The distribution of cultural information within a population defines the 
population’s characteristics. In the current article, we focus on how the first three of these 
propositions impact stereotype formation and maintenance through cultural evolution.  
The last 25-years has seen the emergence of cross-disciplinary research examining the ways 
in which human culture progressively changes over time through what is often termed cumulative 
cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1996, 2005; Tomasello, 1999). Extending the ideas espoused 
by neo-diffusionist theories of culture, theories of cumulative cultural evolution advocate that as 
information is repeatedly socially transmitted, it evolves in a manner analogous to biological 
evolution (Mesoudi, 2009, 2011). It is suggested that every time information passes from one person 
(i.e., an information transmitter) to another person (i.e., an information recipient), it affords the 
recipient the opportunity to modify and potentially improve on the information they receive (e.g., 
Caldwell & Millen, 2008). Where information modifications prove adaptive, these are likely to 
propagate, leading to lasting cultural change that is likely to persist until a future adaptive 
modification; where information modifications are not adaptive, they are unlikely to persist and will 
instead become extinct (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Thus, human culture evolves by 
accumulating adaptations through a process of natural selection. It is suggested that the process of 
cumulative cultural evolution has played a central role in advanced human achievements such as the 
development of language, mathematics and sophisticated technology (Boyd & Richerson, 1988, 
1996, 2005). 
The past decade has seen a substantial increase in lab-based experimental research 
examining the process of cumulative cultural evolution (Baum, Richerson, Efferson, & Paciotti, 2004; 
Caldwell & Millen, 2008; Flynn, 2008; Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008; Kirby, Griffiths, & Smith, 2014; 
Mesoudi, 2009; Whiten, Caldwell, & Mesoudi, 2016). For instance, recent research suggests artificial 
languages that are repeatedly socially transmitted accumulate structure, become increasingly 
learnable and consequently grow to be ever more transmissible over time (Keller, 1994; Kirby et al., 
2008; Kirby et al., 2014). It seems the way in which languages form and evolve via cumulative 
cultural evolution is dependent on people’s observation of linguistic behaviour in their environment, 
the way they cognitively represent this linguistic information, and the way they socially transmit this 
linguistic information (thereby creating new linguistic behaviour that can be observed by others). 
Because there are social and cognitive constraints on the processes of observation, cognitive 
representation and social transmission of linguistic information, there are “bottlenecks” that force 
languages to evolve adaptively (Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Kirby et al., 2008). 
There are some obvious conceptual parallels between the properties of language and the 
properties of stereotypes. Both language and stereotypes rely on cultural consensus. To function 
successfully a language requires widespread knowledge of its rules and meanings (Lehrer, 1984); 
similarly, one of the striking features of societal stereotypes is that there are high levels of consensus 
about their content, irrespective of whether people endorse them or not (Devine, 1989; Katz & 
Braly, 1933; Lepore & Brown, 1997). Both language and stereotypes allow users to make rule-based 
inferences that can be utilised in new situations. For example, grammatical sentences can be 
constructed even though the content of the sentence may be entirely novel (Kirby, 2001); equally, 
we can use category-based stereotypes to make inferences about people we have never previously 
encountered (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Both language and stereotypes 
are culturally learned through iterated learning, often acquired tacitly through repeated interactions 
with other people without the need for explicit instruction (Kirby et al., 2008; Stangor & Schaller, 
2000; Stangor, Sechrist & Jost, 2001). Both languages and stereotypes are profoundly influenced by 
various “bottleneck” constraints (Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Kirby et al., 2008); people can never 
observe the entirety of all possible linguistic/social information, people can never cognitively 
represent the entirety of linguistic/social information they observe, and people can never socially 
transmit to others the entirety of the cognitive representations they form of their linguistic/social 
observations. Given these parallels, it is possible that, like language, societal stereotypes are another 
aspect of human culture whose origins lie in cumulative cultural evolution. 
The formation of novel lab-based stereotypes via cumulative cultural evolution 
Building on classic and contemporary experimental examinations of how information 
evolves as it is socially transmitted (Bartlett, 1932; Kirby et al., 2008), we recently demonstrated that 
novel stereotype-like structure spontaneously forms and evolves when social information is 
repeatedly passed from person to person in the lab (Hutchison et al., in revision; Martin et al., 2014). 
We tested people in continuous transmission chains like those used to examine the formation and 
evolution of languages (e.g., Kirby et al., 2008). At the start of each chain we randomly assigned 
personality attributes to ‘alien beings’ that were individually unique but that also shared category 
membership (i.e., some aliens were the same shape, some were the same colour, some moved in 
the same way).  The first person in a chain (i.e., Generation 1) attempted to learn which attributes 
were associated with a subset of these aliens; a subset of whatever alien-attribute associations this 
person recalled were used as the basis of the training materials for the next person in the chain (i.e., 
Generation 2). 
We found that as information passed from person to person it changed in predictable ways 
(Martin et al., 2014). An initially random set of information that was difficult to remember became 
increasingly memorable as it passed through the generations. Any tendency towards structure 
evidenced in the attribute assignments of one participant were detected and amplified in the 
recollections of the next. Over multiple generations a systematic stereotype-like relationship 
developed, with category features becoming so strongly associated with the possession of specific 
attributes that they could be used to accurately infer information about social targets that had never 
been seen before (e.g., by the end of one chain all green aliens were agreed to be arrogant and 
pushy, while red aliens were thought to be shy).  
One of the striking features of the novel stereotypes formed by the end of the chains was 
that they had no basis in the information people were exposed to at the start of the chains (by 
design, we initialised each chain with an assignment of attributes to aliens which contained no 
reliable category-attribute correlations). Where such category-based overrepresentations 
developed—as after the initial generations of our chains—these were repeatedly observed and then 
amplified by subsequent generations. When there was no existing category-based 
overrepresentation—such as at the very beginning of our chains—relationships between attributes 
and features appeared spontaneously. In this way, cumulative cultural evolution can provide a 
mechanism to explain not only those aspects of stereotypes based on underlying realities but also 
those that are seemingly arbitrary or of no obvious origin (Allport, 1954; Cunningham & Macrae, 
2011; LaPiere, 1936). 
As social information was passed from person to person down our transmission chains it was 
repeatedly forced through bottlenecks each of which had the potential to shape the way that it 
evolved (Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Kirby et al., 2008). Because participants only observed a 
subset sample of the entire alien population, the social information they were learning initially 
passed through a bottleneck of observation. Because participants were unable to correctly 
remember all they observed, the information then passed through a bottleneck of cognitive 
representation. Finally, because only a subset of remembered information was passed to the next 
participant in the chain, the information passed through a social transmission bottleneck. In the 
example of this experiment, there is no real difference between the observation and social 
transmission bottlenecks as they essentially the same randomly determined process. However, by 
combining the bottleneck pressures of cognitive representation with those of social transmission we 
witnessed the formation of novel lab-based stereotypes under conditions relatively free from the 
influence of social identity and intergroup bias.  
A continuous cycle of stereotype evolution 
Extrapolating from our recent novel stereotype formation findings we will now review 
evidence which supports the possibility that a continuous cycle of stereotype formation and 
evolution that is driven by the cumulative effects of information bottlenecks in people’s social 
observations (Stage 1), social cognitive representations (Stage 2) and social transmissions (Stage 3), 
the effects of which accumulate over time as information is repeatedly socially transmitted (see 
Figure 1). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the proposed three stages of stereotype formation and 
maintenance via cumulative cultural evolution. 
Observation (Stage 1): The formation and maintenance of societal stereotypes begins with 
people observing their social environment – because these observations represent an infinitesimally 
small sample of the total number of potential observations that exist across the entire social 
environment they create a bottleneck of social observation. Some of these observed samples will be 
first-hand observations that are based on the perceived characteristics of other people and the 
categories to which they belong. However, many of these observed samples will be second-hand 
observations that are gleaned, for example, from conversations with individuals or exposure to mass 
media. Whether the observed samples are first-hand and second-hand, the resulting bottlenecks 
possess properties that could contribute to the formation and evolution of both stereotypes that 
have some grounding in reality (Judd & Park, 1993) and stereotypes that are seemingly spurious or 
of no obvious origin (Cunningham & Macrae, 2011; LaPiere, 1936). 
There are many examples of stereotypes that have a kernel of truth, based as they are on 
genuine category-attribute associations at the level of category populations (Judd & Park, 1993; 
Madon et al., 1998). For example, the stereotype of Scottish people includes the attribute of having 
red hair, and Scottish people are genetically more likely to have red hair than are people from any 
other nation (Moffat & Wilson, 2011). Where such category-attribute population associations exist, 
they are likely to be detected in people's observed samples of the social environment. Whether 
genuine category-attribute relationships are detected is likely to be governed by the principles of 
statistical inference. Therefore, one would expect population level category-attribute associations to 
be most likely to be detected in samples, and therefore most likely to influence stereotype 
formation and evolution, under circumstances when these associations are strong, when sample 
sizes are large and when samples are unbiased. 
Crucially, many genuine category-attribute relationships are not driven by the fact that most 
category members possess a certain attribute, rather they appear to be based on relative 
comparisons between categories. For example, it is estimated that only 6% of Scottish people have 
red hair, a figure that is substantially lower than estimates of brown, blonde or black hair (Moffat & 
Wilson, 2011). Similarly, a tiny percentage of the world’s red-haired populace live in Scotland. Thus, 
if one were to take a random sample of Scottish people very few would have red hair and if one 
were to take a random sample of the world’s redheads very few of them would be Scottish. Yet 
because the percentage of Scottish people with red hair is relatively higher than the percentage of 
people from any other nation, people’s observed samples are relatively more likely to include 
Scottish people with red hair than they are people from any other nation. 
In reality, most of people's observations of social categories are unlikely to be based on 
samples that are genuinely random or representative of the category population. For example, if an 
observer, who is ignorant of the Scottish stereotype, encounters a sample of Scottish people of 
whom none have red hair, that observer would be unlikely to form a 'Scottish-red hair' association, 
despite the existence of a genuine relative category-attribute association across the category 
population. Alternatively, if an observer encounters a sample of Scottish people of whom half 
happen through random chance to be miserly, that observer would be likely to form a 'Scottish-
miserly' association despite the lack of a genuine category-attribute association across the category 
population. Because spurious category-attribute associations derived from skewed samples are likely 
to diverge across different individuals, the overwhelming majority of these are likely to be washed-
out and never gain the momentum required to become part of the content of societal stereotypes 
(Smith et al., 2017). However, it is likely that some of these spurious category-attribute associations 
will occur often enough to gain sufficient traction to further influence how social information 
evolves and potentially enter societal stereotypes. 
While randomly occurring sampling bias might result in the formation of some spurious 
category-attribute associations, the formation and evolution of societal stereotypes is more likely to 
be influenced by widely experienced biases in culture (Fujioka, 1999; Harris & Sanborn, 2013) and 
cognition (Fiedler, 2000). People’s sample observations are likely to be skewed by the constraints of 
their subjective cultural experience (e.g., skewed by their social contact and socio-economic status, 
skewed by well-known category exemplars, skewed by popular fictional characterisations, skewed 
by media representations), which leads them to make errant inferences about category-attribute 
associations. The problem of skewed sample observations is compounded because people share 
fundamental cognitive biases that constrain their ability to understand and control for these 
sampling constraints (e.g., by predictor sampling, by criterion sampling, by selective outcome 
sampling, by orthogonal sampling; see Fielder, 2000). Irrespective of the source of observed 
sampling biases, if they occur with sufficient frequency across the population they have the potential 
to create spurious category-attribute associations that influence the development of societal 
stereotypes in a similar manner to genuine category-attribute associations.  
Societal stereotypes begin with bottlenecks created by the constraints associated with 
people’s sample observations of the social environment. Sometimes these sample observations lead 
to the development of category-attribute relationships that contain some kernel of truth about the 
category population (Judd & Park, 1993; Madon et al., 1998). Often these sample observations lead 
to the development of category-attribute relationships that are errant and of no obvious origin 
(Cunningham & Macrae, 2011; LaPiere, 1936). Whether they are accurate or errant, for category-
attribute associations to persist and influence the formation and evolution of societal stereotypes 
they need to be cognitively stored in a manner that can subsequently be transmitted to other 
people. 
Cognitive representation (Stage 2): People's cognitive limitations mean they do not possess 
the ability to perceive, store and recall all social information they observe (Schacter, 1999) – this 
shortfall in social information processing capacity creates a bottleneck of cognitive representation. 
When people remember information, they do not precisely recall their observations; rather, their 
memories are subjective reconstructions susceptible to distortion (Schacter, 1999). This means that 
people’s memories of their observations of the social environment are prone to both the omission of 
details that were originally present and the addition of details that were not (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). Because people share a bias towards perceiving categorical structure where 
none exists (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Medin & Smith, 1981) and because people share a bias 
towards sense-making (Bartlett, 1932) and internal consistency (Schacter, 1999; Spiro, 1980), 
information that is inconsistent with category structure is often lost from memories while 
information that is consistent with category structure is more likely to persist or be erroneously 
added (Bartlett, 1932; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999). Thus, when people encounter different 
individuals who belong to the same category, they are more likely to remember similarities between 
them – whether such similarities exist or not – and to forget the ways in which they differ (Stangor & 
McMillan, 1992). Because of these cognitive limitations and biases people's cognitive 
representations of their social environment are likely to be simplified and categorically structured 
(McGarty, 2002). 
Work on stereotype formation via illusory correlation has elegantly demonstrated that 
people tend to draw errant stereotype-like inferences about social groups they have observed 
(Hamilton and Gifford, 1976). Specifically, when they have observed two unevenly sized groups of 
people (e.g., 67% from Group A and 33% from Group B) both of which share the same proportions of 
desirable and undesirable behaviours (e.g., both have 67% desirable behaviours & 33% undesirable 
behaviours), people tend to mistakenly remember that there is a correlation between these skewed 
distributions, such that the majority group are remembered as having more desirable behaviours 
and the minority group are remembered has having more undesirable behaviours (Hamilton & 
Gifford, 1976; for a meta-analysis see Mullen & Johnson, 1990). There is also a separate body of 
work documenting the tendency for people to form category stereotypes through spurious 
correlations because they fail to appropriately consider confounding factors (e.g., Schaller & O'Brien, 
1992). While there are several alternative explanations for both the illusory correlation and spurious 
correlation effects (see Fiedler, 1996, 2000; Meiser & Hewstone, 2006), it is clear that people’s 
cognitive (mis)representations of the information they observe in their social environment leads 
them to create stereotypes that they have not actually observed. 
While cognitive limitations and misrepresentations of the social environment can lead to the 
formation of errant stereotypes, there is also evidence that stereotypes themselves are a major 
source of such errors (Allport & Postman, 1947; Fyock & Stangor, 1994; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; 
Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). It has been shown repeatedly that people are 
better at remembering information consistent with their knowledge of stereotypes relative to 
information inconsistent with these stereotypes (for meta-analyses see Fyock & Stangor, 1994; 
Stangor & McMillan, 1992; although for an alternative interpretation see Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992). 
Similarly, there is evidence people experience stereotype-consistent memory intrusions that lead 
them to falsely believe they have encountered stereotype-consistent information that was never 
present (Lenton, Blair, & Hastie, 2001). Any bias in memory for stereotype-consistent information – 
whether it is a bias in favour of correctly recalling stereotype-consistent information (Fyock & 
Stangor, 1994) or a bias towards stereotype-consistent memory intrusions (Lenton et al., 2001), have 
the potential to influence the way individual people cognitively (mis)represent their own experience 
of social reality. 
People's cognitive representations of their observations of the social environment are 
constrained by limitations and biases that make stereotypic category-attribute associations more 
likely to be errantly formed, detected and amplified. As Hamilton and Gifford suggested, “…cognitive 
factors alone can be sufficient to produce differential perceptions of social groups” (Hamilton & 
Gifford, 1976, p. 405). While cognitive factors alone might can produce stereotypes within 
individuals and potentially similar stereotypes across multiple individuals, the formation and 
evolution of societal stereotypes, the content of which are widely known if not necessarily endorsed 
(Devine, 1989), requires people to transmit their cognitive representations of their social 
observations to other people. 
Social transmission (Stage 3): It is impossible for people to transmit to others all the 
cognitive representations they have formed of their social observations – constraints in the amount 
of information people share with others creates a bottleneck of social transmission.  When people 
transmit their cognitive representations of their observations of the social environment to others 
they create a new second-hand social environment from which other observers can learn. Because 
people’s observations and cognitive representations are liable to produce stereotypic category-
attribute associations (as described above), these are likely to appear in the content of social 
transmission. However, in addition to this, there is also evidence that stereotypic category-attribute 
associations are further amplified by the process of social transmission itself (Lee, Gelfand, & 
Kashima, 2014). 
Because people are constrained in the quantity of information that it is feasible to transmit 
to others, they are highly selective in the information they choose to transmit and show a bias 
towards communicating information that is consistent with their own expectations or the perceived 
expectations of their audience (Clark, 1996; Clark & Kashima, 2007; Kashima, Lyons & Clark, 2013; 
Lyons & Kashima, 2003). Thus, second-generation observers are likely to be exposed to descriptions 
of the social environment that indicate a stronger category-attribute association than the first-
generation observed. Because the second generation is presented with and observes a more skewed 
category-attribute association than was observed by the first-generation, their own biased cognitive 
representations and transmissions are likely to further amplify the magnitude of category-attribute 
bias when transmitted to a third-generation observer.  
The gradual emergence of this stereotype-consistent common ground is harmonious with 
previous research examining the way information evolves as it is repeatedly communicated 
(Kashima et al., 2013; Lyons & Kashima, 2001). Yoshihisa Kashima and colleagues have used social 
transmission chain studies to demonstrate a multitude of ways in which people are biased towards 
communicating information that is consistent with their knowledge of societal stereotypes (Kashima, 
2000). For example, in serial transmission chains that involved repeatedly communicating stories 
that contained both stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information, people showed 
an increasing tendency to communicate stereotype-consistent information as the chains progressed 
(Kashima, 2000). Crucially, the emerging stereotype-consistent communication biases that Kashima 
and colleagues have found seem to be driven by social pressures rather than cognitive constraints 
(Lyons & Kashima, 2003). When people are retelling a story for other people the information they 
choose to share is influenced by their knowledge of the person they are transmitting the story to 
(Clark & Kashima, 2007). Transmitters are often influenced by their perception of whether their 
audience is likely to have knowledge of the content of the stereotype (Kashima et al., 2013), 
whether their audience is likely to endorse the content of the stereotype (Lyons & Kashima, 2003), 
and whether such communications are likely to strengthen the social connection between 
themselves and their audience (Clark & Kashima, 2007). Thus, irrespective of what information 
people can accurately recall from memory, the information they choose to communicate to others is 
likely to contain stereotype-consistent bias, the effects of which accumulate as information is 
repeatedly socially transmitted. 
Not only does stereotype knowledge influence what people remember and transmit to 
others, it also manifests itself in subtle and systematic ways in the language people use (Wigboldus, 
Semin, & Spears, 2000). When people describe stereotype-consistent events they tend to do so with 
a higher level of linguistic abstraction (e.g., “the man was aggressive”) than when describing 
stereotype-inconsistent events (e.g., “the woman raised her voice”; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 
1989; Semin & de Poot, 1997; Wigboldus et al., 2000). While these linguistic differences are 
seemingly unintended, they have the power to influence others’ perceptions of events (Franco & 
Maass, 1996; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997). For example, because people use a 
greater level of linguistic abstraction in their descriptions of stereotype-consistent events, recipients 
of such communications are more likely to believe that people’s actions are driven by their personal 
characteristics rather than their situation (Wigboldus et al., 2000). This subtle linguistic bias means 
that stereotype-consistent communications are more likely to reinforce existing category-attribute 
associations. 
Future directions 
If understanding how societal stereotypes form and evolve requires examining the 
cumulative effects of cognitive bias and social transmission, another exciting prospect is to reverse 
this logic and examine the content of stereotypes to inform our understanding of people's shared 
cognitive biases. In the real-world different stereotypes have different content. Some stereotype 
content is relatively negative (e.g., untrustworthy estate agents), some is relatively positive (e.g., 
trustworthy scientists), whilst some stereotype content is more mixed or even contrary (e.g., older 
adults are stereotypically both bad-tempered and kindly). It is possible that the differences and 
similarities in stereotype content associated with the different groups are driven by the nature of 
the social cognitive biases people share. Indeed, the influential stereotype content model, suggests 
that much of the content of societal stereotypes can be explained by shared biases associated with 
the way that groups of different status are perceived (Fiske et al., 2002). A similar approach has also 
been taken in linguistics, where the existence of substantial skews in the design of human languages 
motivated hypotheses regarding cognitive biases in individuals, which were subsequently confirmed 
experimentally (Culbertson, Legeendre & Smolensky, 2012).  By examining the content of societal 
stereotypes across a divergent range of real-world social categories, it is possible that future 
research might be able to uncover the nature and extent of the social cognitive biases that people 
share. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have reviewed evidence that the formation and evolution of societal 
stereotypes is driven by information bottlenecks in social observation, social cognitive 
representation and social transmission, the effects of which accumulate over time as information is 
repeatedly socially transmitted. We suggest that the reason stereotypes exist and persist is because 
they are perfectly adapted for human cognition and that the reason they are perfectly adapted for 
human cognition is because they are the cumulative product of human cognition. Specifically, we 
contend that societal stereotypes are simplified, categorically structured, and easily learnable 
information systems, because people share fundamental cognitive biases towards simplification, 
categorical structure and easily learnable systems in the way that they observe, cognitively 
represent and transmit social information.    
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Figure 1. A schematic representation of the proposed three stages of stereotype formation and 
evolution via cumulative cultural evolution. 
 
 
